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An Uncommon Alliance: Finding Empowerment
for Exotic Dancers through Labor Unions**
Sarah Chun*
INTRODUCTION
Giggling, the three of us crammed into a small, dark booth at the
famous San Francisco Lusty Lady adult theatre. A dancer from inside the
peep-show room sauntered to our window and began to dance. She looked
into our booth, seemingly amused at the sight of the three voyeurs packed
together. I was intrigued and apprehensive at the same time. Never before
had I been this close to a female exotic dancer. As she stood gyrating in
front of our window, I noticed a button hanging off her g-string which said
"Local 790." A union?
A unionized exotic dancer jarred my preconceived ideas about the
legitimacy of nude dancing as a profession. Because I saw strip clubs as
vehicles that objectify women into sexual beings, I never stopped to
consider these women as workers. The illicit allure of the sex industry
overshadowed any alternate contemplation of them. Yet, seeing that union
button humanized her in my eyes and made me think about her rights and
problems as a worker for the first time.
This Note explores the legal and social barriers that confront exotic
dancers' as workers and the ways in which these obstacles prevent
collective action through unionization. It is an attempt to shed light on a
sector of society that garners considerable attention as sex objects but
receives virtually no concern as workers. Part I considers existing laws
designed to prevent employment discrimination and their inapplicability to
most exotic dancers. Part II discusses the existing barriers to equality faced
by dancers. These challenges include the questionable legal status of
dancers as independent contractors instead of employees, as well as the
** Originally published in 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (1999).
* Third-year law student at the University of California Hastings College of the Law;
1998-99 Symposium Editor, Hastings Women's Law Journal.
1. This Note will only address the social and economic situation specific to female
exotic dancers.
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social stigma attached to exotic dancing that hinders the formation of a
collective voice. Part III questions the propriety of unionization as the right
alternative for sex workers considering the historic gender bias and the
mixed results from past unionizing efforts by dancers. Part IV examines
the relationship between unions and dancers and concludes that this
seemingly uncommon alliance is indeed a symbiotic confluence. In
particular, this section explores the practical implications of unionizing
exotic dance clubs and focuses on current organizing efforts in California.
BACKGROUND
Who is an exotic dancer? Exotic dancers are not easily categorized
since they come from diverse backgrounds. They may be young or old, but
most tend to be younger as the industry places a premium on youth and
physicality.2 Some dance only temporarily, while others become "veteran"
performers. 3 Most dancers are not attracted to exotic performance for the
work itself; quite often they enter the sex industry as an easy way to earn
quick cash - a relatively high pay rate for a vocation requiring no prior
4
schooling or experience.
Dancing is one way for women to earn a living while pursuing other
endeavors. Many dancers are also students, pursue other careers or
support children.6 Dancers in general do not have to work full time to
make a viable income.7 Depending on the caliber of the club and the
number of customers, a "house" dancer who performs regularly at the club
can bring in anywhere from fifty dollars to eight hundred dollars in tips.
One San Francisco dancer claims to have made as much as thirteen
hundred dollars in one evening. 9 "Feature" dancers who have starred in
pornographic movies or adult ma azines can bring in even more money for
guest performances at strip clubs.
2. See Judith Lynne Hanna, Undressing the First Amendment and Corsetting the
Striptease Dancer, 42 TDR 38, June 22, 1998, available in Westlaw, WL 12899047, at *21.
3. See Siobhan Brooks, Interview with Dawn Passar (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
http://www/bayswan.org/siobintvw.html. Dawn Passar is a co-founder of the Exotic
Dancer's Alliance ("EDA"). The EDA is an outreach group that advocates on behalf of
exotic dancers and other sex industry workers. Passar was born in Thailand and worked in
the sex industry in the United States for ten years. She now works at the Asian AIDS
Project in San Francisco.
4. See Susan Sward, Three Dancers' Stories: "You Try Not To Think About It," S.F.
CHRON., May 7, 1994, at A18.
5. See id. See also Andrew Leonard, Market Street Blues, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, July 14,
1993, at 20.
6. See Sward, supra note 4, at Al8.
7. See Hanna, supra note 2, at *21.
8. See Susan Sward, Lap Dancers Want More Than Tips, S.F. CHRON., May 7, 1994, at
Al 7. See also Leonard, supra note 5, at 20. See, e.g., Christine Fuentes, Boogie Nights:
The '70s Are Alive and Well at S.F.'s Gold Club, S.F. EXAM., Nov. 30, 1997, at M16.
9. See Nina Martin, Dancers Cope with the Latest Labor Trend: Making Employees
Independent Contractors, 15 CAL. LAw. 50, 54 (1995).
10. See Eric Schlosser, The Business of Pornography, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
10, 1997, at 42, 47. The nation's top pornography stars can earn between $8,000 to $20,000
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Many dancers claim to feel economically and psychologically
empowered while dancing. They have the full attention of their client as
well as considerable control over their clients' spending habits while at the
club.1 2 Yet, because of the stigmatized nature of their work, many dancers
cannot tell their families or friends about what they do for a living.' 3 Thus,
dancers are vulnerable to exploitation by the clubs that employ them
because they lack the usual support networks that workers in other
industries rely on for advice and encouragement. Traditional society
disapproves of exotic dancers, and most communities seek to keep nude
dancing establishments out of their neighborhoods through public protest
and zoning laws.1 4 Exotic dancing is further demoralized by its association
with illegal activities, such as prostitution, and thus adds to a dancer's
reluctance to view her work as legitimate."
There are additional factors that contribute to a dancer's silence or
inaction when it comes to reporting workplace inequities. Since some
dancers consider their work to be illegitimate, they are reluctant to
complain to club management or state authorities about working terms and
conditions.' 6 Their silence could also originate from the conclusion that
their complaints will have no effect. It is the experience of some dancers
that clubs either ignore their complaints or tell them to work elsewhere.' 7
There is also the problem of transiency in the profession. Dancers often
enter the industry intending to stay only a few months, until they earn
enough cash to meet their needs; yet, they can remain in the field longer
when the work proves to be more lucrative than other job options.' 8
Workers that intend to remain on a job for short periods of time are less
motivated to make or fight for change. Finally, there are those that are
financially dependent on dancing to raise children, pursue other goals or
even support a drug addiction.' 9 Whatever motivates their decision to
remain in the industry, club management uses this financial dependency to
per week for performing four 20-minute shows each night. See id.
11. See Hanna, supra note 2, at *19.
12. See id.
13. See Brooks, supra note 3.
14. See Joseph Sabino Mistick, Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Land Use
Planning, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 533, 535-36 (1996). See also Lisa Malmer, Nude Dancing and
the First Amendment, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1275, 1295 (1991).
15. See John Leo, An Old Job with a Brand New Title, S.D. UNION-TRIB., July 9, 1997, at
B6.
16. See Kerwin Brook, Peep Show Pimps, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 4-10, 1998, at 19.
For example, in San Francisco, the State Labor Commissioner states that it needs to hear
more complaints before it can investigate the alleged unfair labor practices of exotic dance
clubs. So far, very few women have come forward, most likely due to fear of losing their
jobs. See id. at 21.
17. See "Jane", No Justice, No Piece! Strippers Ratijy Union Contract (visited Oct. 29,
1998) <http://www.bayswan.org/EDjust-piec.html>.
18. See Brooks, supra note 3.
19. See id. See also Leonard, supra note 5, at 21.
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exploit and threaten workers.20 Fearing they will be fired or that
management will retaliate against them,21 dancers remain silent-even
when they know their employers are violating the law.22
PART I: WHY EXISTING LEGAL REMEDIES ARE
INEFFECTIVE FOR ADDRESSING DANCERS' CONCERNS
Existing legal remedies which address workplace inequality range from
statutory protection to litigation. 23  At the federal level, two anti-
discrimination statutes apply to women in the workplace. The Equal Pay
Act of 196324 prohibits sex-based wage discrimination between men and
women who perform equivalent, or substantially equal, work. Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act25 prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender
in hiring, promotion, termination, training and other employment terms.
Since these laws attempt to achieve equality in the workplace between men
and women,2 6 they fail to address the abuses suffered by exotic dancers
who are employed in a largely single-sex work environment.
Moreover, most antidiscrimination statutes only protect employees.27
Even if these laws were made applicable to the form of discrimination
faced by exotic dancers, many exotic dancers have been purposely
misclassified by their clubs as independent contractors and thus would not
be covered by laws protecting employees.2 8
Litigation also presents problems because it can be an expensive, time
intensive process which results in a win or lose proposition. To most
working class women, potentially waiting several years to resolve a legal
dispute, risking termination from their job, and paying exorbitant legal fees
present serious deterrents. Even on a basic level, many workers fear that if
they make demands directly to management, or report substandard working
conditions to the authorities, they will be fired or blacklisted.2 9 Moreover,
the reactionary strategy of the club itself is unpredictable. Dancers at one
San Francisco club successfully challenged the twenty-five dollar "stage
20. See Brook, supra note 16, at 18.
21. See Leonard, supra note 5, at 20. See also Brook, supra note 16, at 21.
22. See Brook, supra note 16, at 21.
23. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1920 (1994).
24. 29 U.S.C.A. §206(d) (West 1998).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§2000e-2000e-17 (West 1994).
26. See Crain, supra note 23, at 1921.
27. See Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law
Regulation ofAlternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 682 (1996).
28. See Martin, supra note 9, at 52. The independent contractor/employee classification
issue will be discussed in further detail in Part 11 of this Note.
29. See Brook, supra note 16, at 21. See also Brooks, supra note 3 (Passar was
blacklisted from all clubs in San Francisco because she complained to state authorities about
the lack of doors in the bathroom).
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fees."3 0 In response, the club reclassified the dances performed as
"property" of the club and charged dancers a one-hundred-fifty dollar
commission for using club "property." ' By simply recharacterizing the
nature of an exotic dancer's performance, club management found a new
venue for exploitation, and hence created another legal battle for their
workers.32
Collective action offers a more powerful and timely remedy than
individual or class-action litigation. A club simply cannot operate without
willing dancers. Dancers could use this reality to their advantage by acting
together to significantly increase their bargaining power for better working
conditions. However, collective voice and collective action have
drawbacks. Establishing uniform goals for the group is a major challenge
for this diverse group of women. Developing the motivation and self-
esteem needed to carry through organizing efforts can also be difficult.
These obstacles are discussed in Part II and Part III of this Note.
PART II: BARRIERS TO UNIONIZATION
A. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CHARACTERIZATION.
Independent contractors are sometimes categorized and placed in a
class of "contingent workers" which includes part-time workers, contract
workers and temporary workers. 33 The use of independent contractors and
temporary workers is increasing nationally.34 Independent contractors are
growing in popularity with employers because they are a less expensive
alternative to full-time employees.3 s Moreover, they are flexible enough to
fill in during peak work loads and increase productivity.36 However, the
independent contractor status becomes a disadvantage to employees when
employers improperly classify them as independent contractors to avoid
providing benefits, paying certain taxes and assuming respondeat superior
30. See Brook, supra note 16, at 18.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See U.S. DEP'Ts LABOR & COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 93 (May 1994). See also Jennifer
Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 557, 564-79 (1996).
34. See U.S. DEP'TS LABOR & COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35 (Dec. 1994). See also
Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment and the
Paradox ofProductivity, 26 STETSON L. REv. 1, 2 (1996).
35. See Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional
Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Independence and Relative
Dependence ofEmployees When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section
2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 75, 79 (1997).
36. See Rick A. Pacynski, Legal Challenges in Using Independent Contractors, 72 MICH.
Bus. L.J. 671, 672 (1993).
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liability.37
The work of an employee and an independent contractor can appear to
be the same. Through the eyes of a client, it matters very little whether the
dancer is characterized as an employee or an independent contractor.
However, there are critical legal distinctions between these classifications
for the dancer. Clubs that have characterized their dancers as independent
contractors do not pay their dancers a wage, but rather make them rely
entirely on tips from customers. 38 Additionally, some clubs require their
dancers to pay the club a "stage fee" or a "commission" for the right to
dance in the club and collect tips. 39 This flat fee paid to the club is known
by various names such as "tip-out,,, 40 "shift pay" 41 or "house fee." 4 2 These
amounts have run anywhere from ten dollars 43 to one-hundred-fifty
dollars.4 4 Furthermore, dancers at some clubs are required to split their tips
with other workers or with the management. 45 As an employee, she would
be guaranteed an hourly wage by state46 and federal minimum wage laws, 4 7
as well as be eligible for state workers' compensation and state
unemployment benefits.48
In terms of paying taxes and reporting records to the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"), classifying workers as employees presents much more
work for the employer. Employers must withhold federal and state income
taxes,4 9 withhold taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
("FICA"),50 pay federal and state payroll taxes,5 ' and report wages to both
the IRS and employees on IRS W-2 forms.5 2  In contrast, independent
contractors pose fewer costs and legal obligations to an employer. 3
37. See id. at 672. See also Burdick, supra note 35, at 80.
38. See Reich v. Circle C Investments, 998 F.2d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1993); Harrell v.
Diamond A Entertainment, 992 F. Supp 1343, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Roberts v. Bomareto
Ent., Inc., 956 P.2d 254, 255 (Or. 1998). See also Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights
in Sex Work: The Struggle for Dancers' Rights as Employees, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 521, 523
(1996).
39. See Brook, supra note 16, at 18.
40. See Circle C, 998 F.2d at 326.
41. See Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1346.
42. See Bomareto, 956 P.2d at 255.
43. See Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1346.
44. See Brook, supra note 16, at 18.
45. See Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1346; Martin v. Priba Corporation, 1992 WL 486911, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. 1992). The practice of paying earned tips back to the employer by an
employee (not necessarily an independent contractor) would be unlawful in California. See
CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 1999).
46. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197 (West 1999).
47. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 1998).
48. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 621 (West 1998).
49. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (West 1989).
50. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3102 (West 1989).
51. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 1989).
52. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6051 (West 1989).
53. See Burdick, supra note 35, at 79-90. See also Benson Fischer, supra note 38, at
535-37.
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Employers need only submit an IRS 1099 form for each independent
contractor they pay more than six hundred dollars per year.54 Workers are
then responsible for calculating and paying their own taxes.55
As for employee protection, most labor laws cover only employees, not
independent contractors. By and large federal statutes apply only to
"employees." Thus independent contractors are excluded from coverage
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"),57 Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),5 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA")59 and the Employee
Retirement Insurance Security Act ("ERISA").60 More importantly, for
purposes of this Note, independent contractors are categorically exempt
from coverage under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").61
Thus, under the LMRA, independent contractors are free to act collectively,
but only employees are protected by the LMRA.62 Under California law,
independent contractors are not covered by the Fair Employment and
Housing Act63 which gives employees rights and privileges similar to, but
more expansive than, federal Title VII.6
In addition to statutory exclusions, independent contractors are also
ineligible for protection under common law respondeat superior liability.65
However, numerous exceptions apply to this general rule of nonliability for
66
employers. Notwithstanding exceptions where employers properly
54. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6041 (West 1989).
55. See Benson Fischer, supra note 38, at 537.
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(f) (West 1998). See Kirby v. Swimfasions, 904 F.2d 36 (6th
Cir. 1990).
57. 20 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 1998). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(l)-(4) (West 1998). But see Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405
F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding label "independent contractor" alone does not take worker
out of FLSA protection where work done essentially follows path of employee).
59. 29 U.S.C.A. § 652(6) (West 1985 & West Supp. 1998). See Cochran v. International
Harvester Company, 408 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
60. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(6) (West 1985 & West Supp. 1998). See Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reed, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
61. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (West 1998). The LMRA began in 1935 as the Wagner Act or
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act.
62. See N.L.R.B. v. United Insurance Company, 390 U.S. 254 (1968) (NLRA does not
apply to independent contractors). Antitrust issues could result if independent contractors
acted collectively to restrain trade or commerce. These issues will not be discussed in this
Note.
63. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 1999).
64. FEHA also covers harassment based on pregnancy. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §
12940(h)(3)(C) (West 1999).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 409, § 426 (1965); Taylor v. Oakland
Scavenger, 110 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1941) (employer generally liable for negligent acts of
employee performed within scope of employment, but, independent contractor usually is
alone liable for negligent acts.).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 410, 411, 413-17, 419, 422, 429 (1965).
See also Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., 591 P.2d 503, 506-07 (Cal. 1979) (employer of
independent contractor liable for peculiar risk doctrine for certain harm caused by
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classify independent contractors but still face liability, there are numerous
cases where employers are not shielded because they misclassified their
workers.6 7
Some types of workers are not easily classifiable, falling in the gray
area between employee and independent contractor status. Performers in
general are problematic to categorize because they often exercise a high
level of control over their work product, one characteristic of an
independent contractor. Additionally, their work can be artistic in nature
and often done on a freelance basis. 68 Often, the work of performers does
not possess the obvious attributes of employees such as regular working
hours, places or duties.69  Consequently, employers misclassify them
because they are unsure of theie workers' status, or they purposely
misclassify them to take advantage of independent contractors' low costs. 70
Exotic dance clubs are one such employer that purposely misclassify their
performers as independent contractors.
As far as a legal standard for when a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor, there is no single uniform test and no single factor
is dispositive.72 The IRS has adopted a comprehensive twenty-factor test.73
independent contractor's failure to take precautions, even though employer has provided for
such precautions in contract or otherwise); Gipson v. Davis Realty Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 253
(Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (real estate brokerage still vicariously liable for automobile accident
involving agent even though agent's employment contract characterized him as independent
contractor).
67. See Toyota Motor Sales USA v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (trial court's determination that pizza deliverer was an independent contractor was not
supported by substantial evidence; trial court abused its discretion by basing its decision on
conclusion that no respondeat superior liability existed).
68. See Thomas M. Murray, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misplaced
Reliance on Actual Control Has Disenfranchised Artistic Workers Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 304 (1998).
69. See id.
70. See Carlson, supra note 27, at 664. See also Harrah's Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
71. See Benson Fischer, supra note 38, at 523; Martin, supra note 9.
72. See Pacynski, supra note 36, at 673.
73. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. The twenty factors are: (1) whether a worker
is required to comply with instructions about when; where and how services are to be
performed; (2) whether the worker needs training; (3) whether the worker's services are
integrated into the business operations; (4) whether services are rendered personally; (5)
whether the worker hires, supervises or pays assistants; (6) whether there is a continuing
relationship between worker and employer; (7) whether the worker must comply with set
hours; (8) whether full-time work is required; (9) whether work must be done on employer's
premises; (10) whether the worker must follow the order or sequence set by the employer;
(11) whether the worker must submit oral or written reports; (12) whether the worker gets
paid on a regular basis or per job or by commission; (13) whether business or travel
expenses are paid for; (14) whether the employer fumishes tools and materials; (15) whether
the worker makes a significant investment in the facilities used by the worker; (16) whether
the worker can realize a profit or loss as a result of the worker's services; (17) whether the
worker renders services for more than one employer at a time; (18) whether the worker
makes her services available to the general public; (19) whether the employer has the right
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These factors be grouped into three general categories-control,
organization and entrepreneurship or economic realities.7 4  Despite this
comprehensive test, independent contractors have caused tax collection and
administration problems for the IRS for over twenty years. The thrust of
the problem lies in the independent contractor's understatement of income
and the failure of employers to pay employment taxes and withhold income
by improperly classifying employees as independent contractors.76 The
estimated loss to the government as a result of this misclassification runs in
the billions of dollars each year.77 The IRS's attempts to crack down on
the adult entertainment industry for misclassifications of employees is one
step in the right direction.78 However, these penalties directed at club
owners do not directly benefit dancers or working conditions.
Under the FLSA, an "economic realities" test is used which looks at
whether the putative employee is economically dependent upon the alleged
employer.79 A number of cases challenging the independent contractor
characterization under the FLSA have resulted in a finding that dancers are
employees, not independent contractors. Jurisdictions in Alaska,o
Colorado,8 ' Florida, 82 1 Illinois," Oregon 84 and Texas8 have found that
to discharge or threaten to discharge a worker; (20) whether the worker has the right to
terminate her relationship with the employer. Id.
74. See Pacynski, supra note 36, at 673.
75. See Myron Hulen et al., Independent Contractors: Compliance and Classification
Issues, 11 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 13, 19 (1994).
76. See id. at 19.
77. See id. at 21. In 1992, it was $2 billion. See id.
78. See Bill Alden, Judge: Dancing in the Dark Brings the Tax Code to Light, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A27; Kevin Murphy, Court Rules Exotic Dancers are Employees,
Wisconsin Rapids Club Must Pay $18,000 in Taxes, Appeals Court Says, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 1996, at 5.
79. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947). This "economic
realities" test considers six factors: (1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged
employer; (2) the relative investments of the alleged employer and employee; (3) the degree
to which the employee's opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the employer; (4)
the skill and initiative required in performing the job; (5) the permanency of the relationship
and (6) the degree to which the alleged employee's tasks are integral to the employer's
business. See Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir.
1979).
80. See Jeffcoat v. State of Alaska Dept. of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987)
(Alaska's minimum wage laws based on federal FLSA applied to dancer who spend less
than one hour on stage and spend remaining eight-hour shift soliciting table dances and
tips).
81. See Donovan v. Tavem Talent and Placements, 1986 WL 32746 (D. Colo.) (dancers
who are placed at club by agency or bookkeeping establishment are still dancers entitled to
minimum wage under FLSA).
82. See Harrell v. Diamond A Entertainment, 992 F. Supp. 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
83. See Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 1997 WL 264379 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
84. See Roberts v. Bomareto, 956 P.2d 254 (Or. 1998) (Oregon minimum wage laws
based on federal FLSA applies to exotic dancers who were characterized as independent
contractors). But see Roberts v. Acropolis Mcloughlin, Inc., 945 P.2d 647 (Or. 1997)
(employer no longer responsible for payment of minimum wage after employer stopped
hiring their own dancers and instead used booking agent to get dancers).
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dancers under the conditions presented were employees entitled to
minimum wage in addition to any tips they earned. Likewise, under
workmen's compensation laws, courts in Oregon 86 and Idaho 8 have found
dancers to be entitled to benefits as employees.
The National Labor Relations Board 8 and California8 9 use a "right of
control" test based on general agency principles to distinguish independent
contractors from employees. The factors relied upon by the NLRB are
based on the factors set out in the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations
of the master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.90
85. See Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993); Reich v. Priba
Corporation, 890 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
86. See Cy Investment v. National Council on Compensation Insurance, 876 P.2d 805
(Or. 1994).
87. See Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444 (Idaho 1988).
88. See N.L.R.B. v. United Insurance Company of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968). See
generally Murray, supra note 68.
89. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal.3d 341 (1989).
The definition of employer/employee relationship defined as "the person to whom service is
rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired."
Id. at 350, citing Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 88 Cal. Rptr 175, 177 (Cal.
1970).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). See also, The Comedy Store et
al., 265 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1439 (1992).
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It is difficult to hypothesize whether dancers in general would be
considered employees under this model since the determination is highly
fact specific and each dancer's case is unique. Minimum wage and
workers' compensation cases addressing exotic dancers are a good starting
point as they involve many recurring facts that run throughout strip club
operations. Applying relevant factors of the "right of control" test to these
recurring fact situations, a finding of employee status is a reasonable result.
Exotic dance clubs generally maintain significant control over their
performers by instituting clubs rules and setting prices for dances.91 Some
clubs impose fines on dancers for tardiness or breaking house rules.92
Dancers in some clubs can choose their own music but often it is subject to
the final discretion of the club. 93 The skills or training required for dancing
are minimal. Many dancers have no prior experience before dancing. 9 4 In
fact, some clubs advertise for workers with the lure that "no experience is
necessary." 95
Although dancers provide their own "tools" in the form of their outfits,
they are not free to wear anything they want. For example, in Reich v.
Circle C. Investments, dancers had to wear high heels and their outfits were
subject to the ultimate approval of management.96  Dancers at one club
were required to dress according to the "theme" of each evening.9 7
Moreover, clubs control the premises by designing the stage or creating
special venues for their customers.98 The relative expense of a dancer's
makeup and costumes is minor in comparison to the sometimes millions of
dollars that clubs spend on club atmosphere and facilities. 99 Dancers can
be itinerant, especially "feature" dancers who travel from club to club;
however, "house" dancers are for the most part regular performers of the
club.'" Some clubs allow dancers to sign up for their own shifts,
indicating a level of independence; but, management can restrict the
dancer's conduct once at the club.o'0 Finally, the dancers are the main
91. See Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993); Harrell v.
Diamond A Entertainment, 992 F. Supp. 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Reich v. Priba Corporation,
890 F. Supp. 585, 592 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Cy Investment, Inc. v. National Council on
Compensation Insurance, 876 P.2d 805, 807 (Or. 1994).
92. See Cy Investment, Inc., 876 P.2d at 807; Circle C, 998 F.2d at 324; Harrell, 992 F.
Supp. at 1350.
93. See Circle C, 998 F.2d at 327; Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1350; Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dep't
of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Alaska 1987).
94. See Priba, 890 F. Supp. at 592; Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1351; Circle C, 998 F.2d at
328.
95. See Benson Fischer, supra note 38, at 531.
96. 998 F.2d at 327.
97. See Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1076.
98. See Circle C, 998 F.2d at 328; Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1350.
99. See Priba, 890 F. Supp. at 593.
100. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 5. See also Benson Fischer, supra note 38, at 546.
101. See Circle C, 998 F.2d at 328; Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1350; Priba, 890 F. Supp. at
592.
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attraction to strip clubs and thus integral to the success of the business.
On the other hand, factors that support a finding of independent
contractor status are the method of payment and the parties' belief as the to
nature of the relationship. Dancers usually do not get paid from the club,
but rather get paid only in tips from customers. 102 Some clubs require
dancers to sign independent contractor agreements before performing at the
premises. 10 3  Dancers and clubs also treat their relationship as one of
independent contractor/employer for tax purposes." 4  However, these
factors militating against a finding of employee status are matters that an
employer can manipulate to deny an employee relationship. Requiring a
dancer to sign a contract stating that she is an independent contractor
should not make her one as a matter of law. More attention should be paid
to the acts of the parties, not the conclusory titles established by the
employer.
The NLRB has yet to decide the specific issue of whether exotic
dancers are employees or independent contractors for purposes of the Act.
Cases involving performers have come out both ways, depending on the
facts of each case.
In Puerto Rico Hotel Association, 105 the Board affirmed the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge ("AL") who decided that band leaders
playing in the dining commons for an association of hotels were
employees, not independent contractors. The ALJ placed considerable
attention on the extent of control the hotel had over the band members.
Among other factors, the ALJ looked at the fact that the hotel set the
ambiance of the room and the maitre d' of the hotel could control the
volume of music and require the band to play certain songs.' 0 6 The hotel
required the members to wear certain clothes, and set rules of conduct for
the musicians while at the hotel.1 07 Despite the fact that the band members
were highly skilled and provided their own instruments, the ALJ
determined that these musicians were employees, not independent
contractors.
The hotel association pointed to the fact that it could not dictate the
technical aspects of the band, as to the tempo of the music or other musical
attributes, as an indication of lack of control. However, the ALJ relied on
an example found in the Comments to the Restatement of Agency which
gives the example of a cook.108 "In some cases there may be an
102. See Circle C, 998 F.2d at 326; Harrell, 992 F. Supp. at 1346; Roberts v. Bomareto
Ent., Inc., 956 P.2d 254, 255 (Or. 1998).
103. See Cy Investment, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Insurance, 876 P.2d
805, 807 (Or. 1994); Roberts v. Acropolis McLoughlin, Inc., 945 P.2d 647, 651 (Or. 1997).
104. See Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 807.
105. 259 N.L.R.B. 429 (1981).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 443.
108. See id.
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understanding that an employer shall not exercise control, [for example,
with a full-time cook as servant,] it is understood that the employer will
exercise no control over the cooking."'0 9 The employer has no control over
the manner or style of cooking, but controls enough of the other aspects of
employment as to deem the cook an employee.o"0 A case under the same
analysis can be made for dancers. Club management does not control how
the dancer performs on stage or with a client, but it can nonetheless control
enough other aspects of her work to make her an employee.
In Comedy Store,"' the Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ who
found a group of comedians were not employees under the Act."12
Applying the "right of control" test, along with entrepreneurial
considerations to these performers, the ALJ found that the owner of the
comedy club, Mitzi Shore, had a significant right of control over the
content and style of the performances of the comedians." 3 She did not pay
the comedians for their performances but she did not have to since her club
was an important stepping stone for comedians to advance their careers.ll4
Shore had the exclusive power to book performers at her popular club
where they could be seen and possibly discovered by talent scouts.'
Despite this control by Shore, the performers in Comedy Store engaged
in activity that pushed them into the realm of self-employment by which
the ALJ deemed them independent contractors. 16 The comedians in
question performed in multiple venues and did not rely solely on
respondent's club for work."' The comedians developed their reputation
in the community by using stage names, publicizing their talents in trade
publications and hiring professional agents to organize and procure
bookings." 8
The performers from the Comedy Store case can be distinguished from
exotic dancers. A key element of entrepreneurship is the willingness and
ability to take risks for your business. The comedians in Comedy Store
were willing to work for free because it was part of the risk and investment
into building their reputation in the industry. Regular club dancers are
simply not in that category. As one court put it:
Defendant would have us believe that a dancer like Ms. Harrell could
hang out her own shingle, pay nothing in overhead,-no advertising,
no facilities, no bouncers,-and draw in a constant stream of paying
109. 259 N.L.R.B. 429 (1981).
110. See id.
111. 265 N.L.R.B. 1422 (1982).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1448.
114. See id. at 1446.
115. See id. at 1445.
116. See id. at 1448.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1449.
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customers. A dancer at Diamond A risks little more than a daily "tip-
out" fee, the cost of her costumes, and her time. . .. As is the case with
the zealous waiter at a fancy, four star restaurant, a dancer's stake, her
take and control she exercises over each of these are limited by the
bounds of good service; ultimately, it is the restaurant that takes the
risks and reaps the returns. "9
The dynamic between performers and the Comedy Store is altogether
different from that of dancers and strip clubs. It is unlikely that dancers
would work at clubs for free. Entry into the industry is not competitive.
As long as women are willing and the club approves of their appearance,
they will presumably get hired. Although some dancers use booking agents
to obtain jobs, 120 the club can still maintain significant control over the
dancer's conduct once at the premises.121 Club management also controls
the advertising for the club and consequently the flow of customers to the
club. 122 The entrepreneurial element that persuaded the ALJ in the Comedy
Store is not as compelling in the case of dancers.
B. ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO UNIONIZATION
Outside of worker classification issues, dancers must meet additional
hurdles in terms of self-esteem and commitment to unionize. On the most
basic level, dancers themselves must have the desire to unionize for
collective action. For those who wish not to conform to group activity or
want to remain independent,1 2 3 a union may seem as controlling as club
management since joining a union would obligate them to pay dues and
abide by decisions made through majority vote, with or without their
personal approval. 124
Additionally, it takes self-esteem to create a collective voice because
an individual's convictions must be strong enough to withstand opposition
and pressure from an adverse management. 12 5 Some dancers lack the basic
belief that they deserve better working conditions, as conflicting emotions
119. Harrell v. Diamond A Enterprises, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
120. See Roberts v. Acropolis Mcloughlin, Inc, 945 P.2d 647, 651 (Or. 1997).
121. See Donavan v. Tavern Talent, 1986 WL 32746 (D. Colo. 1986) (dancers placed by
bookee or agent still employees for purposes of FLSA).
122. See Reich v. Priba Corporation, 890 F. Supp 585, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Harrell, 992
F. Supp. at 1352-53; Reich v. Circle C Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. For example, after the unionization of the Lusty Lady in San Francisco, IDA dancers
(who oppose the "employee" status of exotic dancers and want to retain the independent
contractor status) demonstrated in front of the EDA dancers (who oppose the independent
contractor status) by chanting: "Go home Local 2. If we wanted a pimp it wouldn't be you."
The dancers were mistaken about the union Local number (the Lusty Lady signed on with
Local 790), however, the sentiment against unionism is still apparent. See Jack Boulware,
Slap Shots, S.F. WEEKLY, Jan. 29, 1997, at 8.
124. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a) (West 1998).
125. See BRIGID O'FARRELL & JOYCE L. KORNBLUH, ROCKING THE BOAT: UNION WOMEN'S
VOICES 1915-1975, at 6 (1996).
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of self-worth and self-loathing are common in the industry.126 The desire
for anonymity and discretion also hampers organizing efforts because it
prevents some workers from participating in public demonstrations or
outreach programs.
Generally, dancers do not intend to stay in the sex industry
permanently.1 2 7 Even while in the industry, they look forward to leaving
and usually view their past experience with disdain.12 8 This indifferent
attitude about their work corners dancers into a paradox of ineffectual
choices. An acceptance of unionism may represent a resignation to the sex
industry, imbedding a sense of permanency and legitimacy in an
occupation intended to be temporary. On the other hand, a refusal to act
because they view their work situation as temporary or illegitimate keeps
dancers locked into their predicament.
Furthermore, transiency in the profession results in a weak
commitment to the industry. It is obvious that workers who intend to
remain in an industry for only a short time are more likely to tolerate
inequities rather than risk premature termination, or put forth an effort not
guaranteed to change their circumstances. Yet, however impermanent,
dancers are still deserving of better working conditions while employed in
the sex industry.
PART III: IS UNIONIZATION THE RIGHT ALTERNATIVE?
Unionism's historic gender bias and its predominant association with
the concerns of white male workers in the United States may prevent
women from believing that a union could be personally beneficial.1 2 9 In
1914, women were almost excluded from union membership by the
American Federation of Labor ("AFL").'30 In 1918, the AFL changed its
view and adopted a resolution to actively recruit women once it realized
that the increasing employment of unorganized women posed a threat to the
wages and working condition of male union members. '3  Despite the
AFL's policy reversal, it was still slow to address gender restrictions
imposed by some member unions.132
Unions today remain a male-dominated enterprise from the highest
officer positions down to the rank and file.1 33 The low percentage of
female membership does not appear to be from reluctance to participate
126. See Brooks, supra note 3; Leonard, supra note 5, at 22.
127. See Brooks, supra note 3.
128. See Queens of the Tenderloin, Don't Swear. Don't Slouch. When in Doubt, Smile
(visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.bayswan.org/queen.html>.
129. See Crain, supra note 23, at 1907.
130. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 22 (1993).
131. See id. at 22-23.
132. See id. at 23.
133. See Crain, supra note 23, at 1908.
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since women began organizing their own unions as early as 1903134 and
have successfully participated in traditional pressure tactics and labor-
management confrontations.1 35  One study suggests the low number of
women members could be attributed partly to the organizing styles of
certain union campaigns.1 36  Conventional organizing styles used by
manufacturing unions tend to focus on basic economic issues such as wage
and benefits "rather than on social justice issues such as dignity,
discrimination, or voice, which are likely to appeal to pink-collar and
service workers."l37 Additionally, since "the target population has
historically been conceived of as largely male, organizers ignore
comparable worth, sex segregation, sexual harassment, child care, and
other issues of concern to women."' 38
Another factor contributing to women's lack of participation could
originate from the media's poor portrayal of unions in the news and
entertainment industry. 3 9  During labor strikes, union members are
characterized as greedy or unreasonable.1 4 0 The media tends to focus on
public inconvenience and harm resulting from strikes, rather than the
underlying inequities or intolerable working conditions provoking them.141
Even the language used by the media when reporting the same crimes
differs, depending on whether labor officials or management are being
implicated.1 4 2 When labor officials are accused of embezzlement, their
involvement is harshly characterized as "racketeering" or "organized
crime." 4 3 Yet when business leaders allegedly embezzle, news reports
sanitize their actions with less offensive phrases like "white collar
crime." 4 4 Thus, if left solely to rely on the media's depictionl45 or on
popular belief, women may get the impression that labor unions abuse their
power, support financially wasteful and unrealistic work rules and provide
representation that is unnecessary in modem businesses.1 4 6
Although low wages is a factor which motivates organization, more
often it is poor working conditions or a desire for greater dignity and
134. See CRAVER, supra note 130, at 23.
135. See id.




139. See WILLIAM J. PUETTE, THROUGH JAUNDICED EYES: HOW THE MEDIA VIEW
ORGANIZED LABOR 3 (1992).
140. See id. at 5.
141. See id. at 3.
142. See CRAVER, supra note 130, at 53.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See PUETTE, supra note 139, at 4.
146. See CRAVER, supra note 130, at 2.
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control in the work place that puts workers in motion. 147 For workers to
take this kind of action, they must be willing to upset the status quo. They
must also be able to recognize and demand their entitled rights. This is a
challenge particularly difficult for exotic dancers to overcome since many
do not know their legal rights, or as previously discussed, are apprehensive
to assert their rights. 148
There are many ways to fight for workers' rights, however, the most
effective methods deliberately attract public attention.1 49 Since discretion
is such a high priority for some dancers, the publicity involved in such
popular union tactics as strikes or boycotts deters them from voting for a
union or even starting organization efforts.150 However, despite the desire
to remain anonymous, dancers must realize that public outcry is often the
only way to resolve inequities in their favor.'"' Group protests are
extremely effective in bringing unfair workplace practices to light,
especially for those who are oppressed or have little individual political
voice. "'
A greater deterrent to dancers comes from club management efforts to
prevent unionization.' 53  Most private employers oppose unionization-
sometimes going to extremes 5 4 or engaging in elaborate tactics '"-to keep
their workforce nonunion. In the exotic dance club arena, employers are no
different from management in other industries.1 5 6  When dancers
147. See O'FARRELL & KORNBLUH, supra note 125; Christine Fuentes, "Summer Babes"
Join Union, S.F. EXAM., Nov. 30, 1997, at M49. Dancers at the Lusty Lady did not begin
unionizing efforts until management refised to remove the one-way mirrors which
permitted customers to videotape dancers without consent. See id. By the time
management removed the mirrors, the dancers had already agreed that organizing was the
right choice. See id.
148. See Brook, supra note 16, at 21.
149. See Crain, supra note 23, at 1987. Picketing or public boycotts are highly visible
methods that work to garner support from consumers and the general public. See id.
150. See Brooks, supra note 3.
151. See Brook, supra note 16, at 18. For example, in the San Francisco exotic dancer
circuit there are allegations of forced prostitution in some clubs. The Labor Commissioner
will not investigate because no complaints have been filed-not even anonymous ones. The
commissioner simply cannot act unless a person makes a claim. See id.
152. See Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1882-83
(1991).
153. See Brooks, supra note 3. "Most women wanted to organize, but only a few were at
the forefront. For many women that was the only job they had, and they didn't want to lose
it." Id.
154. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965)
(employer threat to close business if union voted considered not an unfair labor practice
where sole reason to shut down business was to avoid negotiating with union).
155. See CRAVER, supra note 130, at 5. It is estimated that both legal and illegal
management tactics ranging from sophisticated election appeals to termination of key union
supporters accounts for 40% of the declining success rate of unions in National Labor
Relations Board elections. See id.
156. See Fuentes, supra note 147, at M49; Craig D. Rose, Upset Over New Rules, Pacer's
Employees Driving to Unionize, S. D. UNIoN-TRIB., Apr. 29, 1993, at Cl (Diane, an
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successfully vote in a union, management may even seek retribution by
making working conditions worse.
Unionization efforts by various exotic dancer groups have met with
mixed results. In 1993 when dancers and employees at Pacer's, a San
Diego exotic dance club, unionized, management retaliated by charging
higher prices for employee purchases and eliminated an area where dancers
took breaks.'18  Local 30 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders International Union immediately filed an unfair labor practice
charge on behalf of its new members. The dancers have since decertified
the union.'"9 In 1997, dancers at the Oakford Inn in Philadelphia voted
31-6 against union representation.1 6 0 Because unionized exotic dancers are
still a novel concept, union elections at dance clubs are highly publicized.
Anticipating the media coverage, one Oakford Inn dancer came to vote in a
mask. 161 In 1996 by comparison, dancers at the Lusty Lady in San
Francisco voted 57-15 in favor of representation by Local 790 of the
Service Employees International Union. 162 Additionally, dancers in Alaska
have voted to unionize and have made considerable progress in addressing
their grievances. 163 Despite these developments, it is still too early to
predict whether this alliance will survive the long run.
PART IV: THE POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EXOTIC DANCERS AND UNIONS
Despite what appears to be an odd coupling from the outset,
unionization of dancers is a viable alternative, considering the history and
statistics of each group. The sex industry is growing rapidly in both
recognition and dollars. This multi-billion dollar industry had its first
"gentleman's club" publicly traded on NASDAQ in 1995.165 One study
shows that Americans now spend more money on strip clubs than all other
forms of live theatre and classical music performances combined.' 66 Nude
employee of eleven years was fired for leading the union drive at Pacer's, a San Diego
exotic dance club).
157. See Craig D. Rose, Union Says Pacer's Violating Labor Law, S. D. UNION-TRIB., Oct.
28, 1993, at Cl.
158. See id.
159. See Hanna, supra note 2, at 23.
160. See Exotic Dancers Vote Against Union, THE PANTAGRAPH, Nov. 11, 1997, at A12.
161. See id.
162. See Fuentes, supra note 147, at M49.
163. See Helen Jung, Club, Union Settle Showboat Owes Dancers $40,456, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, May 5, 1998, at DI.
164. See Anthony Flint, An Industry Still Fights for Acceptance: Sex Without Borders,
BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1996, at Al.
165. See Jesse Katz, Strip Club's Debut on NASDAQ Reveals New Era of Legitimacy, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 13, 1995, at A16.
166. See Schlosser, supra note 10, at 44. "Americans now spend more money at strip
clubs than at Broadway, regional, and nonprofit theaters; at opera, and jazz and classical
music performances--combined." Id.
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dancing cases have also been discussed by our nation's highest Court.167
Despite its growing visibility and legal recognition, the focus of attention is
on the allure of the industry itself, not necessarily the workers who
comprise its varied parts. Labor and employment have confronted this
growing body of workers and will undoubtedly continue to affect them.
In contrast, union membership in the private sector has been declining
since 1953.168 The number of unionized workers in the private sector is
smaller today than when the Wagner Act was enacted in 1935.'"9 To
combat their declining membership, unions need to focus on attracting
untapped industries and populations such as women, minorities and the
service sector.1 70 These are sizable underrepresented sectors which have
been growing as the globalization of the American economy shifts workers
away from manufacturing towards service industries.'"' The Service
Employees International Union ("SEIU") is the fastest growing union in
America.1 72 In 1981, membership was at about six hundred thousand. 7 1
Now, the SEIU is one of the largest unions at 1.3 million members. " The
SEIU's growth can be attributed to a number of factors including its focus
on social justice and equity as well as its large number of female and
minority organizers.'7 5  Given the SEIU's reputation for alternative
methods, it is not surprising that the Lusty Lady dancers in San Francisco
turned to them when they sought unionization.1 7 6
Unions that recognize the special needs of certain groups will be more
successful in their recruitment attempts. Understandably, studies show that
oppressed groups, or those that suffer from low self-esteem, require more
time and effort by organizers. 177 This element is particularly pronounced in
the case of exotic dancers due to the stigmatized nature of their work and
the fear instilled in them by management. 78 Younger female organizers
167. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (nude dancing is
expressive conduct within outer perimeters of First Amendment); Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephram, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (nude dancing does not completely lack
constitutional protection).
168. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 3 (1993). See also CRAVER, supra note 130, at 35.
169. 29 U.S.C. §141 et seq. (1988). See also C. John Cicero, The Classroom as Shop
Floor: Images of Work and the Study ofLabor Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 117, 124 (1995).
170. See CRAVER, supra note 130, at 4.
171. See Cicero, supra note 169, at 125.
172. See Philip Dine, Big Mac' Historic Blast is a Union Bit, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 18, 1998, at C7.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Crain, supra note 136, at 229.
176. See Fuentes, supra note 147, at M49.
177. See Crain, supra note 136, at 229.
178. See Jennifer Bryce, The Daisy Chain: The Autobiography of an Activist (visited Oct.
29, 1998), http://www.bayswan.org/EdaNews_8.html. The author recalls her efforts in her
class action suit against the dance club where she formerly worked: "I passed out hundreds
of fliers with my phone number on it over the last three years, but received very few calls,
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have brought new energy and vitality into the labor organizing
movement.1 79  Those who use flexible and unconventional methods of
organizing may be more successful at organizing women if they take into
account the demanding schedules of working mothers.' 80 In the past,
family responsibilities often prevented women from attending meetings or
participating in organizing efforts.18 ' New methods of organizing, which
have met with success in organizing women, emphasize access and
accommodation through tele-conferencing, potluck meetings, offering child
care and providing more advance notice meetings.' 82
Despite past shortcomings of unions, the labor movement has done
more for the economic well-being of women and poor people than any
other social institution.1 83 Women who belong to unions earn higher wages
as a result of collective bargaining than those who are not members.1 84
Additionally, unions proportionally provide more advantages for women
and persons of color than for white men.'s
The fight for higher wages also acts as a surrogate to remedy other
workplace inequities.' 86 A high wage may represent an employee's worth
on the job-with higher earnings comes a greater feeling of self-worth and
perceived power. 87  For example, when the Lusty Lady dancers in San
Francisco decided to unionize, their goals were not limited to economic
objectives; their driving purpose was to "secure protection and rights."'88
Empowerment through higher wages makes an even greater impact on
workers who perceive manual labor as meaningless. 89
Outside of wages, a union can increase job security, provide increased
even from women I've called friends.... Words of encouragement came furtively via
chance meetings [yet few were willing to volunteer because they could not afford to lose
their jobs since they had children to support]." Id.
179. See Kevin G. Salwen, Why Ms. Brickman of Sarah Lawrence Now Rallies Workers:
New Breed of Labor Organizer is Young, Mostly Female-And Unions' Best Hope, WALL
ST. J., May 24, 1993, at Al.
180. See Crain, supra note 136, at 239.
18 1. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Karl E. Klare, Symposium: New Approaches to Poverty Law, Teaching, and
Practice: Toward Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT'L L.J. 245, 263
(1995).
184. See Women and the Workplace: Looking Toward the Future: Hearing Before the
Subcom. on Employment and Productivity, Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102nd
Cong., Is' Sess. 31 (1991) (offering the joint prepared statements of Drs. Roberta Spalter-
Roth and Heidi Hartmann).
185. See id.
186. See James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071,111 (1987).
187. See id.
188. Fuentes, supra note 147, at M49. A Lusty Lady union organizer on their impetus to
organize: "Our decision to unionize wasn't just based on lunch bucket issues of economics.
Money was an issue, but our main drive was to secure protection and rights." Id.
189. See Pope, supra note 186, at II11.
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employee benefits and better working conditions. In the case of exotic
dancers, although there are many high wage earners in the industry, these
dancers would still benefit significantly from the support of a union.1 90 The
sexual harassment faced on the job from both patrons and management
could be taken more seriously if addressed through a union.' 9' Many
workers would probably not take the initiative against their employer
unless they had union support.192 Knowing that a union is fighting on their
side may provide critical support to an otherwise isolated and demoralizing
working environment.
Although women may be slower to organize than men, once they
decide to join collectively their commitment can be stronger than men.193
The process of joining in a collective voice is a source of empowerment for
women.1 9 4  Participating in pressure strategies and negotiations further
helps reinforce activism. 19 5  Mutual participation in joint activities
solidifies relationships between workers and strengthens the convictions
underlying their commitment.1 96 For example, during the first Lusty Lady
collective bargaining agreement process, the dancers used opposition and
mockery from management attorneys to strengthen their determination and
resolve.' 9 7 As a result of their collective efforts, they secured regular pay
raises according to seniority, one paid sick day and time-and-a-tenth
holiday pay for New Year's Eve.' 98 In 1993, when the employees of
Pacer's sought to unionize, a spokesman for the union found the dancers to
be "unbelievably committed" and eager to learn about the union.' 99 It took
only a week to get most of Pacer's one hundred employees to sign union
190. See Rose, supra note 156, at Cl.
191. See id.
192. See Dorothy Haener, Sometimes You Have to Rock the Boat, in ROCKING THE BOAT:
UNION WOMEN'S VOICES, 1915-1975, at 165. The author, Dorothy Haener says of the
abuses by her supervisor and her first grievance settled by the union:
So I finally worked up the courage to go and complain about it and to ask to
be transferred to another job. The union won the grievance for me. I did get
the new job and increased pay. The union really was fairly good to me. I
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Impressed with the success of California dancers, dancers in other
states have inquired into or begun their own efforts to unionize.2 01 In
Alaska, the Alaska Exotic Dancers Union settled with Showboat Show
Club in May of 1998 for $40,456 in backpay to those fired for unionizing
activities and those who lost wages during a club lockout.202 Though
unionization may not be the answer to all workplace inequities faced by an
exotic dancer, it provides a significant step in securing rights and respect as
workers.
CONCLUSION
The road to unionization is a long one, especially for dancers yet to be
classified as employees. However, if these legal and social barriers can be
overcome, unionization can improve working conditions and raise morale.
Because many dancers fear retaliation from management, or feel powerless
to effectuate a change, a collective voice can benefit them more than other
classes of workers. The power of a collective voice and group action can
help balance bargaining power between dancers and management. Even
for unionization efforts that ultimately fail, the process of organizing can
still bring awareness and momentum towards workplace equality.
200. See id.
201. See EDA Newsletter #9 (visited Mar. 6, 1998).
<http://www.bayswan.org/EdaNews 9.html>; however, not all unionization efforts have
been successful. See Exotic Dancers Vote Against Union, supra note 160, at A 12.
202. See Jung, supra note 163, at DI.
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